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Abstract
Deep learning classifiers are susceptible to well-crafted, imperceptible variations
of their inputs, known as adversarial attacks. In this regard, the study of power-
ful attack models sheds light on the sources of vulnerability in these classifiers,
hopefully leading to more robust ones. In this paper, we introduce AdvFlow: a
novel black-box adversarial attack method on image classifiers that exploits the
power of normalizing flows to model the density of adversarial examples around a
given target image. We see that the proposed method generates adversaries that
closely follow the clean data distribution, a property which makes their detection
less likely. Also, our experimental results show competitive performance of the
proposed approach with some of the existing attack methods on defended classi-
fiers, outperforming them in both the number of queries and attack success rate.
The code is available at https://github.com/hmdolatabadi/AdvFlow.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNN) have been successfully applied to a wide variety of machine learning
tasks. For instance, trained neural networks can reach human-level accuracy in image classifica-
tion [41]. However, Szegedy et al. [48] showed that such classifiers can be fooled by adding an
imperceptible perturbation to the input image. Since then, there has been extensive research in this
area known as adversarial machine learning, trying to design more powerful attacks and coming up
with more robust neural networks. Today, this area encompasses a broader type of data than images,
with video [21], graphs [59], text [30], and other types of data classifiers being attacked.
In this regard, the design of stronger adversarial attacks plays a crucial role in understanding the
nature of possible real-world threats. The ultimate goal of such studies is to help neural networks
be more robust against such adversaries. This line of research is extremely important as even the
slightest flaw in some real-world applications of DNNs such as self-driving cars can have severe,
irreparable consequences [12].
In general, adversarial attack approaches can be classified into two broad categories: white-box
and black-box. In white-box adversarial attacks, the assumption is that the threat model has full
access to the target DNN. This way, adversaries can leverage their knowledge about the target model
to generate adversarial examples (for instance, by taking the gradient of the neural network). In
contrast, black-box attacks assume that they do not know the internal structure of the target model
a priori. Instead, they can only query the model about some inputs, and work with the labels or
confidence levels associated with them [57]. Thus, black-box attacks seem to be making more realistic
assumptions. In the beginning, black-box attacks were mostly thought of as the transferability of
white-box adversarial examples to unseen models [38]. Recently, however, there has been more
research to attack black-box models directly.
Preprint. Under review.
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Figure 1: Adversarial perturbations generated by AdvFlow take the structure of the original image
into account, resulting in less detectable adversaries compared to NATTACK [29] (see Section 4).
The classifier is a VGG19 [45] trained to detect smiles in CelebA [32] faces. (a) AdvFlow magnified
perturbation (b) AdvFlow adversarial example (c) clean image (d) NATTACK adversarial example
(e) NATTACK magnified perturbation
In this paper, we introduce AdvFlow: a black-box adversarial attack that makes use of pre-trained
normalizing flows to generate adversarial examples. In particular, we utilize flow-based methods
to model the probability distribution of possible adversarial examples around a given image. Then,
by exploiting the notion of search gradients from natural evolution strategies (NES), we solve the
black-box optimization problem associated with adversarial example generation. At the end of this
process, we wind up having a data distribution whose realizations are likely to be adversarial. Since
this density is constructed on the top of the original data distribution estimated by normalizing flows,
we see that the generated perturbations take on the structure of data rather than an additive noise (see
Figure 1). This property impedes distinguishing AdvFlow examples from clean data for adversarial
example detectors, as they often assume that the adversaries come from a different distribution than
the clean data. Moreover, we prove a lemma to conclude that adversarial perturbations generated by
the proposed approach can be approximated by a normal distribution with dependent components.
We then put our model under test and show its effectiveness in generating adversarial examples
with 1) less detectability, 2) higher success rate, 3) lower number of queries, and 4) higher rate of
transferability on defended models compared to the similar method of NATTACK [29].
In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We introduce AdvFlow, a black-box adversarial attack that leverages the power of normaliz-
ing flows in modeling data distributions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work
that explores the use of flow-based models in the context of adversarial machine learning.
• We prove a lemma about the adversarial perturbations generated by AdvFlow. As a result of
this lemma, we can deduce that AdvFlows generate perturbations with dependent elements,
while this is not the case for NATTACK [29].
• We show the power of the proposed method in generating adversarial examples that have
a similar distribution to the data. As a result, our method is able to mislead adversarial
example detectors for they often assume adversaries come from a different distribution than
the clean data. We then see the performance of the proposed approach in attacking some of
the most recent adversarial training defense techniques.
2 Related Work
In this section, we review some of the most closely related work to our proposed approach. For a
complete review of (black-box) adversarial attacks, we refer the interested reader to [57, 3].
Black-box Adversarial Attacks. In one of the earliest black-box approaches, Chen et al. [5] used
the idea of Zeroth Order Optimization and came up with a method called ZOO. In particular, ZOO
uses the target neural network queries to build up a zero-order gradient estimator. Then, it utilizes the
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estimated gradient to minimize a Carlini and Wagner (C&W) loss [4] and find an adversarial image.
Later and inspired by [53, 42], Ilyas et al. [18] tried to estimate the DNN gradient using a normally
distributed search density. In particular, they estimate the gradient of the classifier C(x) with
∇xC(x) ≈ EN (z|x,σ2I)
[C(z)∇x log (N (z|x, σ2I))] ,
which only requires querying the black-box model C(x). Having the DNN gradient, Ilyas et al. [18]
then take a projected gradient descent (PGD) step towards minimizing their objective for generating
an adversarial example. This idea is further developed in the construction of NATTACK [29].
Specifically, instead of trying to minimize the adversarial example generation objective directly, they
tried to fit a distribution around the clean data so that its realizations are likely to be adversarial (see
Section 3.3 for more details). Finally, Ilyas et al. [19] observe that the gradients used in adversarial
example generation by PGD have a high correlation both in time and across data. Thus, the number
of queries to a black-box model can be reduced if one incorporates this prior knowledge about the
gradients. To this end, Ilyas et al. [19] uses a bandit-optimization technique to integrate these priors,
resulting in a method called “bandits.”
Adversarial Attacks using Generative Models. There has been some prior work that utilizes the
power of generative models (mostly generative adversarial networks (GAN)) to model adversarial
perturbations and attack DNNs [2, 56, 51, 17]. The target of these models is mainly white-box attacks.
They require training of their parameters to produce adversarial perturbations using a cost function
that involves taking the gradient of a target network. To adapt themselves to black-box settings,
they try to replace this target network with either a distilled version of it [56], or a substitute source
model [17]. However, as we will see in Section 3, the flow-based part of our model is only pre-trained
on some clean training data using the maximum likelihood objective of Eq. (5). Thus, AdvFlow can
be adapted to any target classifier of the same dataset, without the need to train it again. Moreover,
while prior work is mainly concerned with generating the adversarial perturbations (for example [50]),
here we use the normalizing flows output as the adversarial example directly. In this sense, our work
is more like [46] that generates unrestricted adversarial examples using GANs in a white-box setting,
and falls under functional adversarial attacks [27]. However, besides being black-box, in AdvFlow
we restrict the output to be in the vicinity of the original image by utilizing Eq. (3).
3 Proposed Method
In this section, we propose our attack method. First, we define the problem of black-box adversarial
attacks formally. Next, we go over normalizing flows, and see how we can train a flow-based
model. Then, we review the idea of Natural Evolution Strategies (NES) [54, 53] and NATTACK [29].
Afterward, we show how normalizing flows can be mixed with NES in the context of black-box
adversarial attacks, resulting in a method we call AdvFlow. Finally, we prove a lemma about the
nature of the perturbations generated by the proposed approach and show that NATTACK cannot
produce the adversarial perturbations generated by AdvFlow. Our results in Section 4 support this
lemma. There, we see that AdvFlow can generate adversarial examples that are less detectable than
the ones generated by NATTACK [29] due to its perturbation structure.
3.1 Problem Statement
Let C(·) : X d → Pk denote a DNN classifier. Assume that the classifier takes a d-dimensional input
x ∈ X d, and outputs a vector p ∈ Pk. Each element of the vector p indicates the probability of the
input belonging to one of the k classes that the classifier is trying to distinguish. Furthermore, let y
denote the correct class label of the data. In other words, if the y-th element of the classifier output p
is larger than the rest, then the input has been correctly classified. Finally, let the well-known Carlini
and Wagner (C&W) loss [4] be defined as1
L(x′) = max (0, log C(x′)y −max
c 6=y
log C(x′)c
)
, (1)
where C(x′)y indicates the y-th element of the classifier output. In the C&W objective, we always
have L(x′) ≥ 0. The minimum occurs when C(x′)y ≤ maxc6=y C(x′)c, which is an indication that
1 Note that although we are defining our objective function L(x′) for un-targeted adversarial attacks, it can
be easily modified to targeted attacks. To this end, it suffices to replace maxc 6=y log C(x′)c in Eq. (1) with
log C(x′)t, where t shows the target class output. In this paper, we only consider un-targeted attacks.
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our classifier has been fooled. Thus, finding an adversarial example for the input data x can be written
as [29]:
xadv = argmin
x′∈S(x)
L(x′). (2)
Here, S(x) denotes a set that contains similar data to x in an appropriate manner. For example, it is
common to define
S(x) =
{
x′ ∈ X d ∣∣ ‖x′ − x‖p ≤ max} (3)
for image data. In this paper, we define S(x) as in Eq. (3) since we deal with the application of our
attack on images. We also assume that we have access to some training data of the same domain
to pre-train our flow-based model. However, at the time of adversarial example generation, we use
unseen test data. Note that while here we use the same training data as the classifier itself, we are not
obliged to do so. The only requirement is to have some data of the same domain that we can train
our flow-based model on. This argument is valid since we do not make any use of the training data
to learn features that the classifiers are using to distinguish between data, unlike similar generative
methods used for adversarial example generation [2, 56, 51, 17]. In Appendix C.5, we empirically
show that not only is this statement accurate, but we can get almost the same performance by using
similar datasets to the true one.
3.2 Flow-based Modeling
Here, we briefly review the related technical background to flow-based models. For a more detailed
review of normalizing flows, we refer the interested reader to [37, 24] and the references within.
Normalizing Flows. Normalizing flows (NF) [49, 7, 39] are a family of generative models that
aim at modeling the probability distribution of a given dataset. To this end, they make use of the
well-known change of variables formula. In particular, let Z ∈ Rd denote a simple random variable
such as uniform or standard normal. The change of variables formula states that if we apply an
invertible and differentiable transformation f (·) : Rd → Rd on Z to obtain a new random vector
X ∈ Rd, the relationship between their corresponding distributions can be written as:
p(x) = p(z)
∣∣∣∣det(∂f∂z)
∣∣∣∣−1 . (4)
Here, p(x) and p(z) denote the probability distributions of X and Z, respectively. Moreover, the
multiplicative term on the right-hand side is known as the absolute value of the Jacobian determinant.
This term accounts for the changes in the volume of Z due to applying the transformation f(·). Flow-
based methods model the transformation f(·) using stacked layers of invertible neural networks (INN).
They then apply this transformation on a base distribution Z to model the data density. In this paper,
we assume that the base random variable is a standard normal.
Maximum Likelihood Estimation. To fit the parameters of INNs to the i.i.d. data observations
x1,x2, . . . ,xn, NFs use the following maximum likelihood objective [39]:
θ∗ = argmax
θ
1
n
n∑
i=1
log pθ (xi) . (5)
Here θ denotes the parameter set of the model. Note that INNs should be modeled such that they
allow for efficient computation of their Jacobian determinant. Otherwise, this issue can impose a
severe hindrance in the application of NFs to high-dimensional data given the cubic complexity of
determinant computation.
3.3 Natural Evolution Strategies and NATTACK
Natural Evolution Strategies (NES). Our goal is to solve the optimization problem of Eq. (2) in
a black-box setting, meaning that we only have access to the inputs and outputs of the classifier C(·).
Natural Evolution Strategies (NES) use the idea of search gradients to optimize Eq. (2) [54, 53]. To
this end, they define a so-called search distribution, and then try to optimize the expected value of the
original objective under this distribution.
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In particular, let p(x′|ψ) denote the search distribution with parameters ψ. Then, in NES we aim to
minimize
J(ψ) = Ep(x′|ψ) [L(x′)] (6)
over ψ as a surrogate for L(x′) [53]. To optimize Eq. (6), one needs to compute the Jacobian of J(ψ)
with respect to ψ. In doing so, NES makes use of the “log-likelihood trick” [53] (see Appendix A.1)
∇ψJ(ψ) = Ep(x′|ψ)
[L(x′)∇ψ log (p(x′|ψ))] . (7)
Finally, the parameters of the model can be updated using a gradient descent step with learning rate
α:2
ψ ← ψ − α∇ψJ(ψ). (8)
NATTACK. To find an adversarial example for an input x,NATTACK [29] tries to find a distribution
p(x′|ψ) over the set of legitimate adversaries S(x) in Eq. (3). Therefore, they model x′ as
x′ = projS
(
1
2 (tanh(z) + 1)
)
, (9)
where z ∼ N (z|µ, σ2I) is an isometric normal distribution. Moreover, projS(·) projects its input
back into the set of legitimate adversaries S(x). Li et al. [29] define their model parameters as
ψ = {µ, σ}. Then, they find σ using grid-search and µ by the update rule of Eq. (8) exploiting NES.
3.4 Our Approach: AdvFlow
Recently, there has been some effort to detect adversarial examples from clean data. The primary
assumption of these methods is often that the adversaries come from a different distribution than the
data itself; for instance, see [33, 28]. Thus, to come up with more powerful adversarial attacks, it
seems reasonable to construct adversaries that have a similar distribution to the clean data. To this end,
we propose AdvFlow: a black-box adversarial attack that seeks to build inconspicuous adversaries by
leveraging the power of normalizing flows (NF) in exact likelihood modeling of the data [8].
Let f(·) denote a pre-trained, invertible and differentiable NF model on the clean training data.
To reach our goal of decreasing the attack’s detectability, we propose using this pre-trained NF
transformation to model the adversaries. In an analogy with Eq. (9), we assume that our adversarial
example comes from a distribution that is modeled by
x′ = projS
(
f(z)
)
, z ∼ N (z|µ, σ2I) (10)
where projS(·) is a projection rule that keeps the generated examples in the set of legitimate
adversaries S(x). By the change of variables formula from Eq. (4), we know that f(z) in Eq. (10)
is distributed according to the data distribution. The only difference here is that the base density is
transformed by an affine mapping to change the distribution such that the generated examples are
likely to be adversarial.
Putting the rule of the lazy statistician [52] together with our attack definition in Eq. (10), we can
write down the objective function of Eq. (6) as
J(µ, σ) = Ep(x′|µ,σ) [L(x′)] = EN (z|µ,σ2I)
[
L
(
projS
(
f(z)
))]
. (11)
As in NATTACK [29], we will consider σ as a hyperparameter. Thus, we are only required to
minimize J(µ, σ) with respect to µ. Using the “log-likelihood trick” of Eq. (7), we can derive the
Jacobian of J(µ, σ) as
∇µJ(µ, σ) = EN (z|µ,σ2I)
[
L
(
projS
(
f(z)
))∇µ logN (z|µ, σ2I)] . (12)
This expectation can then be estimated by sampling from a distribution N (z|µ, σ2I) and forming
their sample average. Next, we update the parameter µ by performing a gradient descent step
µ← µ− α∇µJ(µ, σ). (13)
In the end, we generate our adversarial example by sampling from Eq. (10).
2Note that this update procedure is not what NES precisely stands for. It is rather a canonical gradient
search algorithm as is called by Wierstra et al. [53], which only makes use of a vanilla gradient [54] for
evolution strategies. In fact, the natural term in natural evolution strategies represents an update of the form
ψ ← ψ − α∇˜ψJ(ψ), where ∇˜ψJ(ψ) = F−1∇ψJ(ψ) is called the natural gradient. Here, the matrix F
is the Fischer information matrix of the search distribution p(x′|ψ). However, since NES in the adversarial
learning literature [18, 19, 29] points to Eq. (8), we use the same convention here.
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Practical Considerations. To help our model to start its search from an appropriate point, we first
transform the clean data to its latent space representation. Then, we aim to find a small additive latent
space perturbation in the form of a normal distribution. Moreover, as suggested in [29], instead of
working with L(projS(f(z))) directly, we normalize them so that they have zero mean and unit
variance. Finally, among different flow-based models, it is preferable to choose those that have a
straightforward inverse, such as [8, 23, 11, 10]. This way, we can efficiently go back and forth between
the original data and its base distribution representation. Algorithm 1 in Appendix D.1 summarizes
our black-box attack method. Other variations of AdvFlow can also be found in Appendix D. These
variations include our solution to high-resolution images and investigation of un-trained AdvFlow.
3.4.1 AdvFlow Interpretation
We can interpret AdvFlow from two different perspectives.
First, there exists a probabilistic view: we use the flow-based model transformation of the original
data, and then try to adjust it using an affine transformation on its base distribution. The amount of
this change is determined by our urge to minimize the C&W cost of Eq. (1) such that we get the
minimum value on average. Thus, if it is successful, we will end up having a distribution whose
samples are likely to be adversarial. Meanwhile, since this distribution is initialized with that of clean
data, it resembles it closely.
Second, we can think of AdvFlow as a search over the latent space of flow-based models. We map
the clean image to the latent space and then try to search in the vicinity of that point to find an
adversarial example. This search is ruled by the objective of Eq. (11). Since our approach exploits a
fully invertible, pre-trained flow-based model, we would expect to get an adversarial example that
resembles the original image in the structure and look less noisy. This adjustment gives our model the
flexibility to produce perturbations that take the structure of clean data into account (see Figure 1).
3.4.2 Uniqueness of AdvFlow Perturbations
In this section, we present a lemma about the nature of perturbations generated by AdvFlow and
NATTACK [29]. As a direct result of this lemma, we can easily deduce that the adversaries gener-
ated by AdvFlow can be approximated by a normal distribution whose components are dependent.
However, this is not the case for NATTACK as they have independent elements. In this sense, we
can then rigorously conclude that the AdvFlow perturbations are unique and cannot be generated by
NATTACK. Thus, we cannot expect NATTACK to be able to generate perturbations that look like the
original data. This result can also be generalized to many other attack methods as they often use an
additive, independent perturbation. Proofs can be found in Appendix A.2.
Lemma 3.1. Let f(x) be an invertible, differentiable function. For a small perturbation δz we have
δ = f
(
f−1(x) + δz
)− x ≈ (∇f−1(x))−1δz.
Corollary 3.1.1. The adversarial perturbations generated by AdvFlow have dependent components.
In contrast, NATTACK perturbation components are independent.
4 Experimental Results
In this section, we present our experimental results. First, we see how the adversarial examples
generated by the proposed model can successfully mislead an adversarial example detector. Then, we
show the attack success rate and the number of queries required to attack both vanilla and defended
models. Finally, we examine the transferability of the generated attacks between defended classifiers.
To see the details of the experiments, please refer to Appendix B. Also, more simulation results can
be found in Appendices C and D.
For each dataset, we pre-train a flow-based model and fix it across the experiments. To this end,
we use a modified version of Real NVP [8] as introduced in [1], the details of which can be found
in Appendix B.1. Once trained, we then try to attack target classifiers in a black-box setting using
AdvFlow (Algorithm 1).
Detectability. One approach to defend pre-trained classifiers is to employ adversarial example
detectors. This way, a detector is trained and then put on top of the classifier. Then, before feeding
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Table 1: Detection rate (in AUROC) of adversarial examples generated by NATTACK [29] and Ad-
vFlow using Mahalanobis detector [28]. In each case, the classifier has a ResNet-34 [15] architecture.
DATASET CIFAR-10 SVHN
ATTACK NATTACK ADVFLOW (OURS) NATTACK ADVFLOW (OURS)
AUROC(%) 97.95 66.87 72.85 64.36
Figure 2: Relative change in the base distribution of an NF model for adversarial examples generated
by AdvFlow and NATTACK for CIFAR-10 [26] (left) and SVHN [36] (right) classifiers of Table 1.
inputs to the un-defended classifier, every input has to be checked whether it is adversarial or not. One
common assumption among these detectors is that the adversaries come from a different distribution
than the data itself [33, 28]. Thus, the performance of such detectors seems to be a suitable measure to
quantify the success of our model in generating adversarial examples that have the same distribution
as the original data. For this reason, we choose Mahalanobis adversarial attack detectors [28] to
assess the performance of the proposed approach against NATTACK [29]. We first generate a set
of adversarial examples alongside some noisy ones using the test set. Then, we use 10% of the
adversarial, noisy, and clean image data to train a Mahalanobis attack detector as described in [28].
We report the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUROC) for each case in Table 1.
As seen, the Mahalanobis adversarial detector [28] struggles to detect the attacks generated by
AdvFlow in contrast to NATTACK. These results support our statement earlier about the distribution
of the attacks being more similar to that of data, hence the failure of Mahalanobis detectors [28].
Interestingly, if we plot the amount of relative change in the base distribution of our flow-based
model for adversarial examples, we see that AdvFlow adversaries are distinctively closer to the
clean data than NATTACK (Figure 2). These results highlight the need to reconsider the underlying
assumption that adversaries come from a different distribution than the data. Also, it can motivate
training classifiers that learn data distributions, as our results reveal that this is not currently the case.
Success Rate and Number of Queries. Next, we investigate the performance of the proposed
model in attacking vanilla and defended image classifiers. It was shown previously that NATTACK
struggles to break into adversarially trained models more than any other defense [29]. Thus, we
select some of the most recent defense techniques that are built upon adversarial training [34]. This
selection also helps us in quantifying the attack transferability in our next experiment. Therefore,
we select Free [43] and Fast [55] adversarial training, alongside adversarial training with auxiliary
rotations [16] as the defense mechanisms that our classifiers employ. Note that these models are
the most recent defenses built upon adversarial training. For a brief explanation of each one of
these methods, please refer to Appendix B.3. We then train target classifiers on CIFAR-10 [26] and
SVHN [36] datasets. The architecture that we use here is the well-known Wide-ResNet-32 [58] with
width 10. We then try to attack these classifiers by generating adversarial examples on the test set.
We compare our proposed model with NATTACK [29], and bandits with time and data-dependent
priors [19]. To simulate a realistic environment, we set the maximum number of queries to 10, 000.
Moreover, for NATTACK and AdvFlow we use a population size of 20. More details on the defense
methods as well as attack hyperparameters can be found in Appendices B.3 and B.4.
Table 2 shows the success rate alongside the average and median number of queries required to
successfully attack a vanilla/defended classifier. Also, Figures 3 and 4 in Appendix C show the attack
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Table 2: Attack success rate and average (median) of the number of queries needed to generate an
adversarial example for CIFAR-10 [26] and SVHN [36]. Note that for NATTACK and AdvFlow we
check whether we arrived at an adversarial point every 200 queries, hence the medians are a multiples
of 200. All attacks are with respect to `∞ norm with max = 8/255.
D
A
TA ATTACK BANDITS/NATTACK/ADVFLOW (OURS)
DEFENSE ACC.(%) SUCCESS RATE(%) ↑ AVG. (MED.) OF QUERIES ↓
C
IF
A
R
-1
0 VANILLA 91.77 98.98/100/99.42 536.05 (164)/241.43 (200)/950.07 (400)
FREEADV 81.29 37.10/38.97/41.21 1430.30 (463)/1414.08 (600)/923.58 (200)
FASTADV 86.33 36.70/36.90/40.22 1425.78 (454)/1390.33 (600)/963.77 (200)
ROTNETADV 86.58 36.67/38.04/40.67 1470.35 (520)/1379.17 (600)/880.86 (200)
S
V
H
N
VANILLA 96.45 87.00/98.77/90.42 2091.74 (1350)/579.19 (200)/1582.87 (800)
FREEADV 86.47 49.67/50.34/50.63 1270.20 (354)/1359.35 (600)/1095.68 (200)
FASTADV 93.90 40.45/35.53/41.39 1337.40 (438)/1454.06 (600)/1046.45 (400)
ROTNETADV 90.33 43.45/41.68/44.37 1187.68 (294)/1177.49 (400)/923.59 (200)
success rate of AdvFlow and NATTACK [29] versus the maximum number of queries for defended
models. As can be seen, AdvFlows can improve upon the performance of NATTACK [29] in all of
the defended models in terms of the number of queries and attack success rate. Also, it should be
noted that although our performance on vanilla classifiers is worse than NATTACK [29], we are still
generating adversaries that are not easily detectable by adversarial example detectors and come from
a similar distribution to the clean data.
Transferability. Finally, we examine the transferability of the generated attacks for each of the
classifiers in Table 2. In other words, we generate attacks using a substitute classifier, and then try to
attack another target model. The results of this experiment are shown in Figure 7 of Appendix C. As
seen, the generated attacks by AdvFlow transfer to other defended models easier than the vanilla one.
This observation precisely matches our intuition about the mechanics of AdvFlow. More specifically,
we know that in AdvFlow the model is learning a distribution that is more expressive than the one used
byNATTACK. Also, we have seen in Section 3.4.2 that the perturbations generated by AdvFlow have
dependent elements in contrast to NATTACK. As a result, AdvFlow learns to attack classifiers using
higher-level features (Figure 1). Thus, since vanilla classifiers use different features for classification
than the defended ones, AdvFlows are less transferable from defended models to vanilla ones. In
contrast, the expressiveness of AdvFlows enables the attacks to be transferred more successfully
between adversarially trained classifiers, and from vanilla to defended ones.
5 Conclusion and Future Directions
In this paper, we introduced AdvFlow: a novel adversarial attack model that utilizes the capacity
of normalizing flows in representing data distributions. We saw that the adversarial perturbations
generated by the proposed approach can be approximated using normal distributions with dependent
components. In this sense, NATTACK [29] cannot generate such adversaries. As a result, AdvFlows
are less conspicuous to adversarial example detectors in contrast to their NATTACK [29] counterpart.
This success is due to AdvFlow being pre-trained on the data distribution, resulting in adversaries
that look like the clean data. We also saw the capability of the proposed method in improving
the performance of NATTACK [29] and bandits [19] on adversarially trained classifiers. This
improvement is in terms of both attack success rate and the number of queries.
Flow-based modeling is an active area of research. There are numerous extensions to the current
work that can be investigated upon successful expansion of normalizing flow models in their range
and power. For example, while NATTACK [29] and other similar approaches [18, 19] are designed
for use on image data, the current work can potentially be expanded to entail other forms of data
such as graphs [31, 44]. Also, since normalizing flows can effectively model probability distributions,
finding the distribution of well-known perturbations can lead to increasing classifier robustness
against adversarial examples. We hope that this work can provide a stepping stone to exploiting such
powerful models for adversarial machine learning.
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Broader Impact
In this paper, we introduce a novel adversarial attack algorithm called AdvFlow. It uses pre-trained
normalizing flows to generate adversarial examples. This study is crucial as it indicates the vulnera-
bility of deep neural network (DNN) classifiers to adversarial attacks.
More precisely, our study reveals that the common assumption made by adversarial example detectors
(such as the Mahalanobis detector [28]) that the adversaries come from a different distribution than
the data is not an accurate one. In particular, we show that we can generate adversaries that come
from a close distribution to the data, yet they intend to mislead the classifier decision. Thus, we
emphasize that adversarial example detectors need to adjust their assumption about the distribution
of adversaries before being deployed in real-world situations.
Furthermore, since our adversarial examples are closely related to the data distribution, our method
shows that DNN classifiers are not learning to classify the data based on their underlying distribution.
Otherwise, they would have resisted the attacks generated by AdvFlow. Thus, it can bring the
attention of the machine learning community to training their DNN classifiers in a distributional
sense.
All in all, we pinpoint a failure of DNN classifiers to the rest of the community so that they can become
familiar with the limitations of the status-quo. This study, and similar ones, could raise awareness
among researchers about the real-world pitfalls of DNN classifiers, with the aim of consolidating
them against such threats in the future.
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Supplementary Materials
This supplementary document includes the following content to support the material presented in the
paper:
• In Section A, we present the “log-likelihood trick" and the proof to our lemma and corollary.
• In Section B, we give the implementation details of our algorithm and experiments. Be-
sides introducing the flow-based model architecture, we present a detailed explanation of
classifier architectures and defense mechanisms used to evaluate our method. The set of
hyperparameters used in each defense and attack model is also given.
• In Section C, we present an extended version of our simulation results. Moreover, we
investigate the effect of the training data on our algorithm’s performance.
• In Section D, we see important extensions to the current work. These extensions include our
solution to high-resolution images and un-trained AdvFlow.
A Mathematical Details
A.1 The Log-likelihood Trick
Here we provide the complete proof of the “log-likelihood trick” as presented in [53]:
∇ψJ(ψ) = ∇ψEp(x′|ψ) [L(x′)]
= ∇ψ
∫
L(x′)p(x′|ψ)dx′
=
∫
L(x′)∇ψp(x′|ψ)dx′
=
∫
L(x′)∇ψp(x
′|ψ)
p(x′|ψ) p(x
′|ψ)dx′
=
∫
L(x′)∇ψ log
(
p(x′|ψ))p(x′|ψ)dx′
= Ep(x′|ψ)
[L(x′)∇ψ log (p(x′|ψ))] .
A.2 Proofs
Lemma A.1. Let f(x) be an invertible, differentiable function. For a small perturbation δz we have
δ = f
(
f−1(x) + δz
)− x ≈ (∇f−1(x))−1δz.
Proof. By the first-order Taylor series for f (·) : Rd → Rd we have
f(z+ δz) ≈ f(z) +∇f(z)δz,
where∇f(z) is the d× d Jacobian matrix of the function f(·). Now, by substituting z = f−1(x), and
using the inverse function theorem [40], we can write
f(f−1(x) + δz) ≈ f(f−1(x)) +
(∇f−1(x))−1δz
which gives us the result immediately.
Corollary A.1.1. The adversarial perturbations generated by AdvFlow have dependent components.
In contrast, NATTACK perturbation components are independent.
Proof. By Lemma 3.1 we know that
δ ≈ (∇f−1(x))−1δz,
where δz is distributed according to an isometric normal distribution. For NATTACK, we have
f(z) = 12
(
tanh(z) + 1
)
. Thus, it can be shown that ∇f−1(x) = diag(2x (1− x)). As a result,
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the random vector δ will be still normally distributed with a diagonal covariance matrix, and hence,
have independent components. In contrast, we know that for an effective flow-based model∇f−1(x)
is not diagonal. Otherwise, this means that our NF is simply a data-independent affine transformation.
For example, in Real NVP [8] which we use, this matrix is a product of lower and upper triangular
matrices. Hence, for a normalizing flow model f(·) we have non-diagonal ∇f−1(x). Thus, it will
make the random variable δ normal with correlated (dependent) components.
B Implementation Details
In this section, we present the implementation details of our algorithm and experiments. Note that all
of the experiments were run using a single NVIDIA Tesla V100-SXM2-16GB GPU.
B.1 Normalizing Flow Details
For the flow-based models used in AdvFlow, we implement Real NVP [8] by using the framework
of Ardizzone et al. [1].3 In particular, let z = [z1, z2] denote the input to one layer of a normalizing
flow transformation. If we denote the output of this layer by x = [x1,x2], then the Real NVP
transformation between the input and output of this particular layer can be written as:
x1 = z1  exp
(
s1 (z2)
)
+ t1 (z2)
x2 = z2  exp
(
s2 (x1)
)
+ t2 (x1) ,
where  is an element-wise multiplication. The functions s1,2(·) and t1,2(·) are called the scaling
and translation functions. Since the invertibility of the transformation does not depend on these
functions, they are implemented using ordinary neural networks. To help with the stability of the
transformation, Ardizzone et al. [1] suggest using a soft-clamp before passing the output of scaling
networks s1,2(·) to exponential function. This soft-clamp function is implemented by
sclamp =
2α
pi
arctan
( s
α
)
,
where α is a hyperparameter that controls the amount of softening. In our experiments, we set
α = 1.5. Moreover, at the end of each layer of transformation, we permute the output so that we end
up getting different partitions of the data as z1 and z2. The pattern by which the data is permuted is
set at random at the beginning of the training process and kept fixed onwards.
After passing the data through some high-resolution transformations, we downsample it using i-
RevNet downsamplers [20]. Specifically, the high-resolution input is downsampled so that each one
of them constitutes a different channel of the low-resolution data.
To help the normalizing flow model learn useful features, we use a fixed 1 × 1 convolution at the
beginning of each low-resolution layer. This adjustment is done with the same spirit as in Glow [23].
However, instead of having a trainable 1× 1 convolution, here we initialize them at the beginning of
the training and keep them fixed afterward.
Finally, we used a multi-scale structure [8] to reduce the computational complexity of the flow-based
model. Specifically, we pass the input through several layers of invertible transformations constructed
using convolutional neural networks as s1,2(·) and t1,2(·). Then, we send three-quarters of the
data directly to the ultimate output. The rest goes through other rounds of mappings, which use
fully-connected networks. This way, one can reduce the computational burden of flow-based models
as they keep the data dimension fixed.
For training, we use an Adam [22] optimizer with weight decay 10−5. Besides, we set the learning
rate according to an exponential scheduler starting from 10−4 and ending to 10−6. Also, to dequantize
the image pixels, we add a small Gaussian noise with σ = 0.02 to the pictures. Table 3 summarizes
the hyperparameters and architecture of the flow-based model used in AdvFlow.
B.2 Mahalanobis Detector Details
Lee et al. [28] propose an adversarial example detector based on a Mahalanobis distance-based
confidence score. To this end, the authors first extract features from different hidden layers of a
3github.com/VLL-HD/FrEIA
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Table 3: Hyperparameter and architecture details for normalizing flow part of AdvFlow.
OPTIMIZER ADAM
SCHEDULER EXPONENTIAL
INIT. LR 10−4
FINAL LR 10−6
BATCH SIZE 64
EPOCHS 350
ADDED NOISE STD. 0.02
MULTI-SCALE LEVELS 2
EACH LEVEL NETWORK TYPE CNN-FC
HIGH-RES TRANSFORMATION BLOCKS 4
LOW-RES TRANSFORMATION BLOCKS 6
FC TRANSFORMATION BLOCKS 6
α (CLAMPING HYPERPARAMETER) 1.5
CNN LAYERS HIDDEN CHANNELS 128
FC LAYERS INTERNAL WIDTH 128
ACTIVATION FUNCTION LEAKY RELU
LEAKY SLOPE 0.1
nominated DNN classifier. Assuming that these features are distributed according to class-conditional
Gaussian densities, the detector aims at estimating the mean and covariance matrix associated with
each one of the features across the training set. These densities are then used to train a logistic
regression classifier based on the Mahalanobis distance confidence score between a given image
feature and its closest distribution.
The training set used to train the logistic regression classifier consists of three types of data: clean,
noisy, and adversarial. We take the test portion of each dataset and add a slight noise to them to make
noisy data. The clean and noisy data are going to be used as positive samples of the logistic regression.
For the adversarial part of the data, we then use a nominated method and generate adversarial
examples that are later used as negative samples of the logistic regression. After constructing the
dataset, 10% of it is used as the logistic regression training set, and the rest for evaluation. Also, all
the hyperparameters of the Mahalanobis detector are set using nested cross-validation.
In this paper, we use the official implementation of the Mahalanobis adversarial example detector
available online4. For more information about these detectors, see [28].
B.3 Details of Defense Methods
In this section, we briefly review the defense techniques used in our experiments. We will then present
the set of parameters used in the training of each one of the classifiers. Note that we only utilized
these methods for the sake of evaluating our attack models, and our results cannot be regarded as a
close case-study, or comparison, of the nominated defense methods.
B.3.1 Review of Defense Methods
Adversarial Training. Adversarial training [34] is a method to train robust classifiers. To achieve
robustness, this method tries to incorporate adversarial examples into the training process. In
particular, adversarial training aims at minimizing the following objective function for classifier C(·)
with parameters θ:
min
θ
∑
i
max
‖δ‖≤
`
(C(xi + δ), yi). (14)
Here, xi and yi are the training examples and their associated correct labels. Also, `(·) is an appro-
priate cost function for classifiers, such as the standard cross-entropy loss. The inner maximization
objective in Eq. (14) is the cost function used to generate adversarial examples. Thus, we can
interpret Eq. (14) as training a model that can predict the labels correctly, even in the presence of
additive perturbations. However, finding the exact solution to the inner optimization problem is not
4github.com/pokaxpoka/deep_Mahalanobis_detector
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straightforward, and in most real-world cases cannot be done efficiently [25]. To circumvent this
problem, Madry et al. [34] proposed approximately solving it by using a Projected Gradient Descent
algorithm. This method is widely known as adversarial training.
Adversarial Training for Free. The main disadvantage of adversarial training, as proposed in [34],
is that solving the inner optimization problem makes the algorithm much slower than standard
classifier training. This problem arises because solving the inner maximization objective requires back-
propagating through the DNN. To address this issue, Shafahi et al. [43] exploits a Fast Gradient Sign
Method (FGSM) [14] with step-size  to compute an approximate solution to the inner maximization
objective and then update the DNN parameters. This procedure is repeated m times on the same
minibatch. Finally, the total number of epochs is divided by a factor of m to account for repeated
minibatch training. We use the PyTorch code available on the official repository of the free adversarial
training to train our classifiers.5
Fast Adversarial Training. To make adversarial training even faster, Wong et al. [55] came up
with a method called “fast" adversarial training. In this approach, they combine FGSM adversarial
training with the idea of random initialization to train robust DNN classifiers. To make the proposed
algorithm even faster, Wong et al. [55] also utilize several fast training techniques (such as cyclic
learning rate and mixed-precision arithmetic) from DAWNBench competition [6]. In this paper, we
replace the FGSM adversarial training with PGD. However, we still use the cyclic learning rate and
mixed-precision arithmetic. For this method, we used the official PyTorch code available online.6
Adversarial Training with Auxiliary Rotations. Gidaris et al. [13] showed that Convolutional
Neural Networks can learn useful image features in an unsupervised fashion by predicting the amount
of rotation applied to a given image. Throughout their experiments, they observed that these features
can improve classification performance. Motivated by these observations, Hendrycks et al. [16]
suggest exploiting the idea of self-supervised feature learning to improve the robustness of classifiers
against adversaries. Specifically, it is proposed to train a so-called “head” alongside the original
classifier. This auxiliary head takes the penultimate features of the classifier and aims at predicting
the amount of rotation applied to an image from four possible angles (0◦, 90◦, 180◦, or 270◦). It was
shown that this simple addition can improve the performance of adversarially trained classifiers. To
train our models, we make use of the PyTorch code for adversarial learning with auxiliary rotations
available online.7
B.3.2 Hyperparameters of Defense Methods
Tables 4 and 5 summarize the hyperparameters used for training our defended classifiers.
Table 4: Hyperparameters of defense methods for training CIFAR-10 [26] classifiers. Numbers 1 and
2 correspond to Wide-ResNet-32 [58] and ResNet-50 [15] architectures, respectively.
CLASSIFIER FREE-1 FREE-2 FAST-1 FAST-2 ROTNET-1 ROTNET-2
OPTIMIZER SGD SGD SGD SGD SGD SGD
LR 0.1 0.005 0.21 0.21 0.1 0.1
MOMENTUM 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
WEIGHT DECAY 0.0002 0.0002 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
NESTEROV N N N N Y Y
BATCH SIZE 128 64 64 128 128 128
EPOCHS 125 100 100 100 100 100
INNER OPTIMIZATION FGSM FGSM PGD PGD PGD PGD
 8/255 8/255 8/255 8/255 8/255 8/255
STEP SIZE 8/255 8/255 2/255 2/255 2/255 2/255
NUMBER OF STEPS (REPEATS) 8 8 5 5 10 10
5github.com/mahyarnajibi/FreeAdversarialTraining
6github.com/anonymous-sushi-armadillo
7github.com/hendrycks/ss-ood
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Table 5: Hyperparameters of defense methods for training SVHN [36] classifiers. Numbers 1 and 2
correspond to Wide-ResNet-32 [58] and ResNet-50 [15] architectures, respectively.
CLASSIFIER FREE-1 FREE-2 FAST-1 FAST-2 ROTNET-1 ROTNET-2
OPTIMIZER SGD SGD SGD SGD SGD SGD
LR 0.0001 0.01 0.21 0.21 0.1 0.1
MOMENTUM 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
WEIGHT DECAY 0.0002 0.0002 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
NESTEROV N N N N Y Y
BATCH SIZE 128 128 64 128 128 128
EPOCHS 100 100 100 100 100 100
INNER OPTIMIZATION FGSM FGSM PGD PGD PGD PGD
 8/255 8/255 8/255 8/255 8/255 8/255
STEP SIZE 8/255 8/255 2/255 2/255 2/255 2/255
NUMBER OF STEPS (REPEATS) 8 8 5 5 10 10
B.4 Hyperparameters of Attack Methods
In this part, we present the set of hyperparameters used for each attack method. For NATTACK [29]
and AdvFlow, we tune the hyperparameters on a development set so that they result in the best
performance for an un-defended CIFAR-10 classifier. In the case of bandits with time and data-
dependent priors [19], we use two sets of hyperparameters tuned for these methods. For the vanilla
classifiers we use the hyperparameters set in [19], while for defended classifiers we use those set
in [35]. Once set, we keep the hyperparameters fixed throughout the rest of experiments. Tables 6-8
summarize the hyperparameters used for each attack method in our experiments.
Table 6: Hyperparameters of bandits with time and data-dependent priors [19].
HYPERPARAMETER VANILLA DEFENDED
OCO LEARNING RATE 100 0.1
IMAGE LEARNING RATE 0.01 0.01
BANDIT EXPLORATION 0.1 0.1
FINITE DIFFERENCE PROBE 0.1 0.1
TILE SIZE (6px)2 (4px)2
Table 7: Hyperparameters of NATTACK [29].
HYPERPARAMETER VALUE
σ (NOISE STD.) 0.1
SAMPLE SIZE 20
LEARNING RATE 0.02
MAXIMUM ITERATION 500
Table 8: Hyperparameters of AdvFlow (ours).
HYPERPARAMETER VALUE
σ (NOISE STD.) 0.1
SAMPLE SIZE 20
LEARNING RATE 0.02
MAXIMUM ITERATION 500
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C Extended Experimental Results
In this section, we present an extended version of our experimental results.
C.1 Table of Attack Success Rate and Number of Queries
Table 9 presents attack success rate, as well as average and median of the number of queries for
AdvFlow alongside bandits [19] and NATTACK [29]. In each case, we have also shown the clean
data accuracy and success rate of the white-box PGD-100 attack for reference. Details of classifier
training and defense mechanism can be found in Appendix B.3. As can be seen, when it comes to
attacking defended models, AdvFlow can outperform the baselines in both the number of queries and
attack success rate.
C.2 Success Rate vs. Number of Queries
Figures 3-6 show the success rate of AdvFlow and NATTACK [29] as a function of the maximum
number of queries for defended models. As can be seen, given a fixed number of queries, AdvFlow
can generate more successful attacks.
C.3 Confusion Matrices of Transferability
Figure 7 shows the transferability rate of generated attacks to various classifiers. Each entry shows
the success rate of adversarial examples intended to attack the row-wise classifier in attacking the
column-wise classifier. There are a few points worth mentioning regarding these results:
• AdvFlow attacks are more transferable between defended models than vanilla to defended
models. We argue that the underlying reason is the fact that AdvFlow learns a higher-level
perturbation to attack DNNs. As a result, since vanilla classifiers use different features than
the defended ones, they are less adaptable to attack defended classifiers. In contrast, since
NATTACK acts on a pixel level, they are less susceptible to this issue.
• Generally, adversarial examples generated by AdvFlow are more transferable between
different architectures than NATTACK. The same argument as in our previous point applies
here.
• Transferability of black-box attacks is not as important as in the white-box setting. The
reason is that in the case of black-box attacks, since no assumption is made about the
model architecture, we can try to generate new adversarial examples to attack a new target
classifier. However, for white-box attacks, transferability is somehow related to their success
in attacking previously unseen target networks. Thus, it is essential to have a high rate of
transferability if a white-box attack is meant to be deployed in real-world situations where
often, we do not have any access to internal nodes of a classifier.
C.4 Samples of Adversarial Examples
Figure 8 shows samples of adversarial examples generated by AdvFlow andNATTACK [29], intended
to attack a vanilla Wide-ResNet-32 [58]. As the images show, AdvFlow can generate adversarial
perturbations that often take the shape of the original data. This property makes AdvFlows less
detectable to adversarial example detectors. In contrast, it is clear that the perturbations generated by
NATTACK come from a different distribution than the data itself. As a result, they can be detected
easily by adversarial example detectors.
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Figure 3: Success rate vs. maximum number of queries to attack CIFAR-10 [26] classifiers with
Wide-ResNet-32 [58] architecture.
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Figure 4: Success rate vs. maximum number of queries to attack SVHN [36] classifiers with
Wide-ResNet-32 [58] architecture.
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Figure 5: Success rate vs. maximum number of queries to attack CIFAR-10 [26] classifiers with
ResNet-50 [15] architecture.
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Figure 6: Success rate vs. maximum number of queries to attack SVHN [36] classifiers with
ResNet-50 [15] architecture.
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Figure 7: Confusion matrix of transferability for adversarial attacks generated by AdvFlow (ours)
and NATTACK [29]. Each entry shows the success rate of adversarial examples originally generated
for the row-wise classifier to attack the column-wise model. Also, the numbers 1 and 2 in the name
of each classifier indicates whether it has a Wide-ResNet-32 [58] or ResNet-50 [15] architecture,
respectively.
22
CIFAR-10 [26] SVHN [36]
Figure 8: Magnified perturbation and adversarial examples generated by AdvFlow (ours) and
NATTACK [29] alongside the clean data. As can be seen, the adversaries generated by AdvFlow are
better disguised in the data, while NATTACK [29] look noisy (better viewed in digital format).
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C.5 Training Data and Its Effects.
In the closing paragraph of Section 3.1 we discussed that while we are using the same training data as
the classifier for our flow-based models, it does not have any effect on the performance of generated
adversarial examples. This claim is valid since we did not explicitly use this data to either generate
adversarial examples or learn their features by which the classifier intends to distinguish them. To
support our claim, we replicate the experiments of Table 2 for the case of CIFAR-10 [26]. This
time, however, we select 9000 of the test data and pre-train our normalizing flow on them. Then, we
evaluate the performance of AdvFlow on the remaining 1000 test data. We then report the attack
success rate and the average number of queries in Table 10 for this new scenario (Scenario 2) vs. the
original case (Scenario 1).
As can be seen, the performance does not change in general. The little differences between the two
cases come from the fact that in Scenario 1, we had 50000 training data to train our flow-based model,
while in Scenario 2 we only trained our model on 9000 training data. Also, here we are evaluating
AdvFlow performance on 1000 test data in contrast to the whole 10000 test images used in assessing
Scenario 1. Finally, it should be noted that we get even a more balanced relative performance for the
fair case where we split the training data 50/50 between classifier and flow-based model. However,
since the performance of the classifier drops in this case, we only report the unfair situation here.
Table 10: Attack success rate and average (median) of the number of queries to generate an adversarial
example for CIFAR-10 [26]. Scenario 1 corresponds to the case where we use the whole CIFAR-10
training data to train our normalizing flow. Scenario 2 indicates the experiment in which we train our
flow-based model on 9000 images from CIFAR-10 test data. The architecture of the classifier in all of
the cases is Wide-ResNet-32 [58]. Also, all attacks are with respect to `∞ norm with max = 8/255.
D
A
TA SUCCESS RATE(%) ↑ AVG. (MED.) OF QUERIES ↓
DEFENSE SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO 2 SCENARIO 1 SCENARIO 2
C
IF
A
R
-1
0 VANILLA 99.42 98.91 950.07 (400) 949.78 (400)
FREEADV 41.21 40.22 923.58 (200) 962.31 (200)
FASTADV 40.22 40.93 963.77 (200) 1114.68 (200)
ROTNETADV 40.67 40.32 880.86 (200) 876.57 (400)
More interestingly, we observe that in case we train our flow-based model on some similar dataset to
the original one, we can still get an acceptable relative performance. More specifically, we train our
flow-based model on CIFAR-100 [26] dataset instead of CIFAR-10 [26]. Then, we perform AdvFlow
on the test data of CIFAR-10 [26]. We know that despite being visually similar, these two datasets
have their differences in terms of classes and samples per class.
Table 11 shows the performance of AdvFlow in this case where it is pre-trained on CIFAR-100
instead of CIFAR-10. As the results indicate, we can achieve a competitive performance despite our
model being trained on a slightly different dataset. Furthermore, a few adversarial examples from
this model are shown in Figure 9. We see that the perturbations are still more or less taking the shape
of the data.
Table 11: Attack success rate and average (median) of the number of queries to generate an adversarial
example for CIFAR-10 [26] test data. The train data row shows the data that is used for training
the normalizing flow part of AdvFlow. The architecture of the classifier in all of the cases is
Wide-ResNet-32 [58]. Also, all attacks are with respect to `∞ norm with max = 8/255.
T
E
S
T SUCCESS RATE(%) ↑ AVG. (MED.) OF QUERIES ↓
DEF/TRAIN DATA CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100 CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100
C
IF
A
R
-1
0 VANILLA 99.42 98.72 950.07 (400) 1198.03 (600)
FREEADV 41.21 39.95 923.58 (200) 955.05 (200)
FASTADV 40.22 38.83 963.77 (200) 1017.66 (200)
ROTNETADV 40.67 39.28 880.86 (200) 910.55 (200)
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Figure 9: Magnified perturbation and adversarial examples generated by AdvFlow alongside the
clean data using flow-based models trained on CIFAR-100 [26] (left) and CIFAR-10 [26] (right).
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D AdvFlow and Its Variations
D.1 AdvFlow
Algorithm 1 summarizes the main adversarial attack approach introduced in this paper.
Algorithm 1 AdvFlow for inconspicuous black-box adversarial attacks
Input: Clean data x, true label y, pre-trained flow-based model f(·).
Output: Adversarial example x′.
Parameters: noise variance σ2, learning rate α, population size np, maximum number of queries Q.
1: Initialize µ randomly.
2: Compute zclean = f−1(x).
3: for q = 1, 2, . . . , bQ/npc do
4: Draw np samples from δz = µ+ σ where  ∼ N (|0, I).
5: Set zk = zclean + δzk for all k = 1, . . . , np.
6: Calculate Lk = L
(
projS
(
f(zk)
))
for all k = 1, . . . , np.
7: Normalize Lˆk =
(Lk −mean(L))/std(L).
8: Compute ∇µJ(µ, σ) = 1np
∑np
k=1 Lˆkk.
9: Update µ← µ− α∇µJ(µ, σ).
10: end for
11: Output x′ = projS
(
f(zclean + µ)
)
.
D.2 Greedy AdvFlow [9]
We can modify Algorithm 1 so that it stops upon reaching a data point where it is adversarial. To this
end, we only have to actively check whether we have generated a data sample for which the C&W
cost of Eq. (1) is zero or not. Besides, instead of using all of the generated samples to update the
mean of the latent Gaussian δz , we can select the top-K for which the C&W loss is the lowest. Then,
we update the mean by taking the average of these latent space data points. Applying these changes,
we get a new algorithm coined Greedy AdvFlow. This approach is given in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Greedy AdvFlow for inconspicuous black-box adversarial attacks
Input: Clean data x, true label y, pre-trained flow-based model f(·).
Output: Adversarial example x′.
Parameters: noise variance σ2, voting population K, population size np, maximum number of
queries Q.
1: Initialize µ randomly.
2: Compute zclean = f−1(x).
3: for q = 1, 2, . . . , bQ/npc do
4: Draw np samples from δz = µ+ σ where  ∼ N (|0, I).
5: Set zk = zclean + δzk for all k = 1, . . . , np.
6: Calculate Lk = L
(
projS
(
f(zk)
))
for all k = 1, . . . , np.
7: if any Lk becomes 0 then:
8: Output the x′ = projS
(
f(zk)
)
for which Lk = 0 as the adversarial example.
9: break
10: end if
11: Find the top-K samples zk with the lowest score Lk.
12: Update µ← 1K
∑
k∈top−K δzk.
13: end for
Table 12 shows the performance of the proposed method with respect to AdvFlow. As can be seen,
this way we can improve the success rate and number of required queries.
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Table 12: Attack success rate and average (median) of the number of queries to generate an adversarial
example for CIFAR-10 [26], and SVHN [36]. The architecture of the classifier in all of the cases
is Wide-ResNet-32 [58]. Also, all attacks are with respect to `∞ norm with max = 8/255. The
hyperparameters used for Greedy AdvFlow are the same as Table 8. In each iteration, we select the
top-4 data samples to update the mean.
D
A
TA SUCCESS RATE(%) ↑ AVG. (MED.) OF QUERIES ↓
DEFENSE GREEDY ADVFLOW ADVFLOW GREEDY ADVFLOW ADVFLOW
C
IF
A
R
-1
0 VANILLA 99.12 99.42 991.98 (460) 950.07 (400)
FREEADV 41.06 41.21 842.37 (180) 923.58 (200)
FASTADV 40.06 40.22 904.78 (200) 963.77 (200)
ROTNETADV 40.50 40.67 821.80 (180) 880.86 (200)
S
V
H
N
VANILLA 92.40 90.42 1305.06 (540) 1582.87 (800)
FREEADV 52.57 50.63 816.54 (200) 1095.68 (200)
FASTADV 43.03 41.39 781.06 (240) 1046.45 (400)
ROTNETADV 45.43 44.37 653.82 (160) 923.59 (200)
D.3 AdvFlow for High-resolution Images
Despite their ease-of-use in generating low-resolution images, high-resolution image generation with
normalizing flows is computationally demanding. This issue is even more pronounced in the case
of images with high variabilities, such as the ImageNet [41] dataset, which may require a lot of
invertible transformations to model them. To cope with this problem, we propose an adjustment to
our AdvFlow algorithm. Instead of generating the image in the high-dimensional space, we first map
it to a low-dimension space using bilinear interpolation. Then, we perform the AdvFlow algorithm
to generate the set of candidate examples. Next, we compute the adversarial perturbations in the
low-dimensional space and map them back to their high-dimensional representation using bilinear
upsampling. These perturbations are then added to the original target image, and the rest of the
algorithm continues as before. Figure 10 shows the block-diagram of the proposed solution for
high-resolution data. Moreover, the updated AdvFlow procedure is summarized in Algorithm 3.
Changes are highlighted in red.
To test the performance of the proposed approach, we pre-train a flow-based model on a 64 × 64
version of ImageNet [41]. The normalizing flow architecture and training hyperparameters are as
shown in Table 3. Furthermore, we use bandits with data-dependent priors [19] andNATTACK [29] to
compare our model against them. For bandits, we use the tuned hyperparameters for ImageNet [41] in
the original paper [19]. Also, for NATTACK [29] and AdvFlow we observe that the hyperparameters
in Tables 7 and 8 work best for the vanilla architectures in this dataset. Thus, we kept them as before.
We use the nominated black-box methods to attack a classifier in less than 10, 000 queries. We
use pre-trained Inception-v3 [47], ResNet-50 [15], and VGG-16 [45] classifiers available on
torchvision as our vanilla target models. Also, a defended ResNet-50 [15] model trained by
D
ow
nsam
pler
NF −
U
psam
pler
+
Figure 10: AdvFlow adjustment for high-resolution images. Instead of working with high-dimensional
image, we downsample them. Then after generating candidate low-resolution perturbations, we map
them to high-dimensions using a bilinear upsampler.
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Algorithm 3 AdvFlow for high-resolution black-box attack
Input: Clean data x, true label y, pre-trained flow-based model f(·).
Output: Adversarial example x′.
Parameters: noise variance σ2, learning rate α, population size np, maximum number of queries Q.
1: Initialize µ randomly.
2: Downsample x and save it as xlow.
3: Compute zclean = f−1(xlow).
4: for q = 1, 2, . . . , bQ/npc do
5: Draw np samples from δz = µ+ σ where  ∼ N (|0, I).
6: Set zk = zclean + δzk for all k = 1, . . . , np.
7: Compute and upsample γk = f(zk)− xlow for all k = 1, . . . , np.
8: Calculate Lk = L
(
projS
(
γk + x
))
for all k = 1, . . . , np.
9: Normalize Lˆk =
(Lk −mean(L))/std(L).
10: Compute ∇µJ(µ, σ) = 1np
∑np
k=1 Lˆkk.
11: Update µ← µ− α∇µJ(µ, σ).
12: end for
13: Upsample γ = f(zclean + µ)− xlow.
14: Output x′ = projS
(
γ + x
)
.
fast adversarial training [55] with FGSM ( = 4/255) is used for evaluation. This model is available
online on the official repository of fast adversarial training.8
Table 13 shows our experimental results on the ImageNet [41] dataset. As can be seen, we get similar
results to CIFAR-10 [26] and SVHN [36] experiments in Table 2: in case of vanilla architectures,
we are performing slightly worse than NATTACK [29], while in the defended case we improve their
performance considerably. It should also be noted again that in all of the cases we are generating
adversaries that look like the original data, and come from the same distribution. This property is
desirable in confronting adversarial example detectors. Figure 11 depicts a few adversarial examples
generated by AdvFlow compared to NATTACK [29] for a vanilla Inception-v3 [47] DNN classifier.
As seen, the AdvFlow perturbations tend to take the shape of the data to reduce the possibility
of changing the underlying data distribution. In contrast, NATTACK perturbations are pixel-level,
independent additive noise that cause the adversarial example distribution to become different from
that of the data.
Table 13: Attack success rate and average (median) of the number of queries needed to generate an
adversarial example for ImageNet [41]. Note that for NATTACK and AdvFlow we check whether we
arrived at an adversarial point every 200 queries, hence the medians are multiples of 200. All attacks
are with respect to `∞ norm with max = 8/255. * The accuracy is computed with respect to the
1000 test data used for attack evaluation.
D
A
TA ATTACK BANDITS/NATTACK/ADVFLOW (OURS)
ARCH. ACC*(%) SUCCESS RATE(%) ↑ AVG. (MED.) OF QUERIES ↓
IM
A
G
E
N
E
T INCEPTION-V3 99.20 88.21/95.06/87.50 1486.16 (632)/1180.06 (600)/1961.75 (1000)
VGG16 92.50 95.67/99.57/97.51 611.43 (166)/487.94 (200)/1361.64 (800)
VAN. RESNET 95.00 96.00/99.47/95.57 1053.44 (415)/750.47 (400)/1583.70 (800)
DEF. RESNET 71.50 50.77/33.99/57.20 2167.67 (1006)/2276.54 (1200)/1392.17 (400)
8github.com/anonymous-sushi-armadillo
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AdvFlow (ours) Clean Image NATTACK
Figure 11: Magnified perturbation and adversarial examples generated by AdvFlow (ours) and
NATTACK [29] alongside the clean data for ImageNet [41] dataset. The target network architecture
is Inception-v3 [47].
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D.4 AdvFlow for People in a Hurry!
Alternatively, one can use the plain structure of AdvFlows for black-box adversarial attacks. To this
end, we are only required to initialize the normalizing flow randomly. This way, however, we will
be getting random-like perturbations as in NATTACK [29] since we have not trained the flow-based
model. Using this approach, we can surpass the performance of the baselines in vanilla DNNs. In fact,
giving away a little bit of performance is the price we pay to force the perturbation to have a data-like
structure so that the adversaries have a similar distribution to the data. Table 14 summarizes the
performance of randomly initialized AdvFlow in contrast to bandits with data-dependent priors [19]
and NATTACK [29] for vanilla ImageNet [41] classifiers. Also, Figure 12 shows a few adversarial
examples generated by randomly initialized AdvFlows in this case.
Table 14: Attack success rate and average (median) of the number of queries needed to generate an
adversarial example for ImageNet [41]. Note that for NATTACK and AdvFlow we check whether we
arrived at an adversarial point every 200 queries, hence the medians are multiples of 200. All attacks
are with respect to `∞ norm with max = 8/255. * The accuracy is computed with respect to the
1000 test data used for attack evaluation.
ATTACK BANDITS/NATTACK/ADVFLOW (RANDOM INIT.)
ARCH. ACC*(%) SUCCESS RATE(%) ↑ AVG. (MED.) OF QUERIES ↓
INCEPTION-V3 99.20 88.21/95.06/97.78 1486.16 (632)/1180.06 (600)/653.81 (400)
VGG16 92.50 95.67/99.57/99.35 611.43 (166)/487.94 (200)/339.28 (200)
VAN. RESNET 95.00 96.00/99.47/99.16 1053.44 (415)/750.47 (400)/428.45 (200)
Pre-trained AdvFlow Clean Image Random AdvFlow
Figure 12: Magnified perturbation and adversarial examples generated by AdvFlow in trained and
un-trained scenarios for ImageNet [41] dataset. The target network architecture is Inception-v3 [47].
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